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DRUG PRICES, DYING PATIENTS, AND THE
PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETPLACE: A NEW
CONDITIONAL APPROVAL PATHWAY FOR CRITICAL
UNMET MEDICAL NEEDS
By Robert A. Bohrer J.D., LL.M.*
ABSTRACT
Prescription drugs have been a major topic in the news for much of
the past year. There are two issues which appear often: first, the very
high prices of new drugs, particularly the "specialty" drugs developed
for serious diseases; and second, the time required for FDA approval
in relation to the perceived need for earlier access to new therapies for
critically ill patients. Much less in the news, but lurking behind both
issues, is the need for better information for physicians and patients to
use in making decisions about prescribing and taking drugs, and for
insurance companies and the government o use to structure their
pharmaceutical benefits plans. This Article proposes an approach to
accelerated access and drug prices that would generate this much-
needed information for doctors, patients, the government, and private
insurers. The new form of conditional approval proposed here would
be similar to the parallel track program developed by the FDA in the
1990s, during the HIV crisis. I argue that, like parallel track, the FDA
could implement the conditional approval proposed here under its
existing authority, that this approach would allow critically ill
patients wide access to desperately needed drugs, and would also
control prices for drugs that have not demonstrated clinical benefit
until sufficient information is available about their real safety and
efficacy.
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, B.A. Haverford College, J.D. U. of
Illinois, LL.M. Harvard Law School. I have benefitted from discussions with numerous
colleagues and from diligent work by a number of research assistants. I wish to particularly
thank for their comments the FDA scholars who have made the ASLME Annual Health Law
Professors Conference my academic home. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the invaluable
support of my editor-in-chief, Karen Bohrer.
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INTRODUCTION: DRUG PRICING, ACCELERATED ACCESS, AND
INFORMATION ABOUT DRUG EFFECTIVENESS
Prescription drugs have been a major topic in the news for
much of the past year. There are two issues which appear quite
often: the exceptionally high prices of new drugs,' particularly
the "specialty" drugs developed for serious diseases, and the
time required for FDA approval in relation to the perceived
1. See, e.g., Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: The Trump Administration is Taking
on Middlemen that Inflate Drug Prices, WASH. PosT (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-health-202/2019/02/01/the-health-202-02012019-health2O2
/5c5303dalb326b29c3778d32/?utm_term=.baf783fal725; Stephanie Armour, Trump's Plan to
Lower Drug Prices: A Q&A, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2018, 6:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/trumps-plan-to-lower-drug-prices-a-q-a-1526077290.
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need for earlier access to new therapies for critically ill patients.2
Much less in the news, but lurking behind both issues, is the
need for more accessible and useful information for physicians
prescribing drugs, patients, and insurance companies and the
government structuring pharmaceutical benefit plans that
reimburse patients for some portion of the cost of drugs. This
Article proposes an approach to both accelerated access and
drug prices that would provide the information that doctors,
patients, the government, and private insurance companies
need to appropriately make decisions about drug prescriptions,
access, and coverage.
Both the high price and complex and lengthy process of
getting new drugs to critically ill patients pose serious
problems.3 It is vital to get drugs to desperate patients as
quickly as possible without overwhelming them and the
healthcare system. However, the solutions to these problems
currently at the forefront of the debate-"Right to Try" laws4
and insuring that price rebates benefit patients rather than their
insurers or their insurers' pharmacy benefit managers
("PBMs")5-fail to fully address either patients' needs or the
workings of the pharmaceutical marketplace. Now is the time
to move forward with a new approach to accelerate access to
new drugs for critically ill patients, while also tackling the
soaring prices of the drugs they need.
2. See, e.g., President Donald J. Trump to Sign Right to Try Legislation Fulfilling the Promise He
Made to Expand Healthcare Options for Terminal Americans, WHTE HOUSE (May 30, 2018), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-sign-right-try-
legislation-fulfilling-promise-made-expand-healthcare-options-terminal-americans/; Kate
Rawson, Gottlieb Defends Accelerated Approval, Scorns Access Limits by Payors, PINK SHEET (Oct.
23, 2017), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS121818/Gottlieb-Defends-
Accelerated-Approval-Scorns-Access-Linits-By-Payors; Steven M. Joffe & Holly Fernandez
Lynch, Federal Right-to-Try Legislation -Threatening the FDA's Public Health Mission, 378 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 695, 695, 697 (2018).
3. See supra notes 1-2.
4. See discussion infra Section III.A.
5. See Fraud and Abuse; Removal of Safe Harbor Protection for Rebates Involving
Prescription Pharmaceuticals and Creation of New Safe Harbor Protection for Certain Point-of-
Sale Reductions in Price on Prescription Pharmaceuticals and Certain Pharmacy Benefit
Manager Service Fees, 84 Fed. Reg. 2340, 2344 (Feb. 6, 2019) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
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While the Right to Try laws and FDA pre-approval access
provisions-such as single-patient Investigational New Drug
application ("INDs"), or accelerated approval and
breakthrough drug approval-provide earlier access to
critically needed drugs, it is at the cost of significant evidence
about the actual effectiveness of those drugs.6 Any reasonable
approach to drug pricing requires substantial knowledge of a
drug's effectiveness. If a fundamental characteristic of a
functioning market is that the prices of goods are related to their
value to the buyer, the pharmaceutical market cannot function
well when a drug is approved before its value is established on
the endpoints of real value to patients-what patients really
care about is, for example, overall survival (in cancer) or the
long-term ability to function in degenerative diseases like
Parkinson's or Muscular Dystrophy. Now is a time where real
change is possible, as President Trump along with Democratic
and Republican members of Congress have expressed concern
about the high cost of drugs. This rare political consensus might
make it possible to pursue a more effective method of
accelerating access to drugs for critically ill patients and, at the
same time, reduce the costs of those drugs.
One way to strike a better balance between accelerated access
and limiting drug prices until their value is known would be a
new form of "conditional approval," with prices discounted
until full approval is warranted. High prices and delays in
getting drugs to desperate patients may appear to be separate
problems, but both are rooted in the same fundamental
information problem. Implementing the form of conditional
approval proposed in this Article would be a major step
towards providing the needed information and solving both the
delay problem and the pricing problem.
6. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., EXPANDED ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL




A NEW CONDITIONAL APPROVAL PATHWAY
Part II of this Article provides a basic overview of the FDA's
approval process for new drugs. Part III describes the FDA's
current approaches to pre-approval access and accelerated
approval for drugs for critically ill patients, which provide
access to drugs on the basis of less than substantial evidence of
actual patient clinical benefit. Part IV explains the FDA's role in
providing information to the pharmaceutical market and
discusses in further detail the kind of information generated by
the FDA approval process. Part V considers whether the FDA's
process is really necessary or if a free market could work as
well. Data from the advisory committee process7 and literature
on the weaknesses in industry-funded studies8 is used to
demonstrate the value of the FDA's approval process in the
marketplace for pharmaceuticals. Part VI provides the
framework for a "conditional approval" pathway for allowing
early access to drugs that could accelerate access, reduce prices,
and more quickly provide the information that doctors,
patients, and providers need. Part VII concludes that the
conditional approval pathway proposed in this Article would
better align the interests of patients and insurers with respect to
desperately needed but essentially unproven therapeutics.
Conditional approval would require only minimal legislative
action to guarantee insurance coverage for conditionally-
approved drugs at a relatively low pre-final approval price. In
our current era of concern over the price of drugs, conditional
approval may provide an attractive and politically viable step
toward an overall solution to the problems of escalated pricing
and time-consuming approval processes.
7. See What is an FDA Advisory Committee?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov
/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm222191.htm (last updated Mar. 28, 2018) (defining FDA
advisory comnittee).
8. See Joel Lexchin et al., Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome and
Quality: Systematic Review, 326 BRTT. MED. J. 1167, 1169 (2003) (discussing studies that found
drug-company-sponsored research is of a better quality than industry-funded research).
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II. THE FDA's APPROVAL PROCESS FOR NEw DRUGS
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) defines a drug as
a substance "intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals ...
[or] intended to affect the structure or any function of the body
of man."9 To sell a new drug the manufacturer or sponsor of the
drug needs to file an application and submit "full reports of
investigations which have been made to show whether or not
such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective." 0
In practice, "full reports of investigations" means the results of
preclinical testing in the laboratory, both in vitro and in
animals, as well as the results of human clinical trials."
Preclinical testing in the lab is completed first. Only upon
successful completion of preclinical testing will the drug be
ready to test in humans.
Traditionally, human testing has been divided into three
stages, or "phases," of experimental trials.12 Often Phase 1 trials
are designed only to get a preliminary assessment of the drug's
safety.13 The subjects are usually healthy volunteers and
therefore no evidence of how much effect in treating disease, or
efficacy data, would be generated.14 However, in some cases,
particularly cases of drugs prescribed for serious diseases
where no effective therapy exists, initial testing is done in
9. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2018).
10. Id. § 355(b)(1).
11. See e.g., The FDA's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-information-consumers/fdas-drug-review-
process-ensuring-drugs-are-safe-and-effective (last updated Nov. 24, 2017) [hereinafter The
FDA's Drug Review Process]. An application to approve a new drug for marketing "includes all
animal and human data and analyses of the data, as well as information about how the drug
behaves in the body and how it is manufactured." Id.
12. See Step 3: Clinical Research, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/patients
/drug-development-process/step-3-clinical-research (last updated Jan. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Step
31.
13. Id.
14. The FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 11.
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patients with the disease.16 Phase 1 trials in diseased patients
may provide some preliminary efficacy data.16 In addition to
looking for adverse effects, a principal goal of the first phase of
human testing is to generate significant information about the
drug's in vivo metabolism in humans, including absorption,
half-life, and distribution within the body.17 Such information is
referred to as the drug's "pharmacokinetics."S
Phase 2 trials test multiple doses of the drug and involve
further safety testing and efficacy testing on patients diagnosed
with the disease or condition.19 The relationship between a
drug's dose and its biological effects is referred to as
pharmacodynamics.20 If Phase 2 trials provide evidence that the
drug continues to appear safe and potentially effective, then
Phase 3 trials follow, which generally involve significantly
more patients.21
15. Step 3, supra note 13 ("However, if a new drug is intended for use in cancer patients,
researchers conduct Phase 1 studies in patients with that type of cancer."); see also Nam Q. Bui
& Shivaani Kummar, Evolution of Early Phase Clinical Trials In Oncology, 96 J. MOLECULAR MED.
31, 33 (2018).
16. See Bui & Kummar, supra note 15.
17. Gerlie Gieser, Ph.D., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Office of Clinical Pharmacology,
Presenter at the 2012 Clinical Investigator Course: Clinical Pharmacology-Phase 1 Studies and
Early Drug Development (2012), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/training
/clinicalinvestigatortrainingcourse/ucm340007.pdf.
18. Jennifer Le, Overview of Pharmacokinetics, MERCK MANUAL, https://
www.merckmanuals.com/professional/clinical-pharmacology/pharmacokinetics/overview-of-
pharmacokinetics (last updated May 2019).
19. The FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 11; U.S. National Library of Medicine, Glossary
of Common Site Terms, NIH, https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/about-studies/glossary (last updated
June 2019).
20. Abimbola Farinde, Overview of Pharmacodynamics, MERCK MANUAL, https://www
.merckmanuals.com/professional/clinical-pharmacology/pharmacodynamics/overview-of-
pharmacodynamics (last updated June 2019).
21. See Overview of Clinical Trials, CENTERWATCH, https://www.centerwatch.com/clinical-
trials/overview.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2019). The difference between statistical and clinical
significance is worth noting. Statistical significance is merely an indication that the difference
between experimental groups is relatively unlikely to be due to chance. The generally accepted
standard for statistical significance is that the difference between experimental groups would
occur by chance less than five times in one hundred. See Getting Started with Statistics Concepts,
STATSOFT, http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/esc.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2019). Clinical
significance is largely a function of the extent to which the difference between the experimental
groups reflects a difference that doctors and patients would recognize as meaningful to the
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Phase 3 trials vary widely in size depending on the
seriousness of the disease for which the drug is being tested, the
prevalence of the disease, and the estimated magnitude of the
drug's effect.2 These are usually multicenter studies conducted
to prove safety and efficacy and look for adverse reactions in a
larger population.23 The less frequently an adverse ffect occurs,
the bigger the trial will need to be to have any likelihood of
detecting it. For example, an adverse reaction likely to occur in
one percent of the population has only about a sixty-three
percent chance of occurring even once in any particular one
hundred-person clinical trial.24 Thus, clinical trials of a few
hundred patients are unlikely to detect serious adverse
reactions that occur only once in one thousand patients.
Although in most cases Phase 3 trials should be sensitive
enough to provide at least preliminary evidence of the most
significant safety issues, for conditions that have a significant
likelihood of mortality within a relatively short term, safety
concerns become less significant and much smaller studies may
be accepted. For a disease such as metastatic pancreatic cancer,
with a twelve-month or more survival rate of twelve percent of
patients,25 a one in one hundred risk of a serious adverse effect
patient. See W-C Leung, Balancing Statistical and Clinical Significance in Evaluating Treatment
Effects, 77 POSTGRADUATE MED. J. 201, 201 (2001). For example, in a large enough trial, a 30 mm.
difference in tumor size between treated and untreated groups might be statistically significant,
while that difference may have no real "clinical" significance on either patient quality of life or
survival. See id.
22. See The FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 11. When a drug is tested in a clinical trial,
the greater the difference between the outcome of the patients who received the drug and the
outcome of those receiving the control agent (placebo or other drug) the stronger the "signal"
produced by the trial. When the signal is expected to be strong, a smaller trial would be
sufficient to reach statistical significance. See Caroline Helwick, Update on Overall Survival for
Newly Diagnosed Patients With Metastatic Pancreatic Cancer, ASCO POST (Mar. 10, 2017),
http://www.ascopost.com/issues/march-10-2017/update-on-overall-survival-for-newly-
diagnosed-patients-with-metastatic-pancreatic-cancer/.
23. Adam Cheng et al., Conducting Multicenter Research in Healthcare Simulation: Lessons
Learned from the INSPIRE Network, 2 ADVANCES IN SIMULATION 1 (2017) ("Multicenter research
confers many distinct advantages over single-center studies, including larger sample sizes for
more generalizable findings and .. . are more likely to improve provider performance and/or
have a positive impact on patient outcomes.").
24. ROBERT A. BOHRER, A GUIDE TO BIOTECHNOLOGY LAW AND BUSINESS 228 (2007).
25. Helwick, supra note 22.
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may be of little concern. Given the grim prognosis of the
disease, approval of the drug could be based on a Phase 3 trial
of approximately two hundred patients.2 6 Similarly, drugs for
serious and very rare diseases are often tested in much smaller
groups. For example, the study leading to the approval of
Aldurazyme "for patients with Hurler and Hurler-Scheie forms
of Mucopolysaccharidosis I (MPS I) and for patients with the
Scheie form who have moderate to severe symptoms" 27 was
based on forty-five patients, twenty-two in the drug group and
twenty-three who received a placebo.28
At the end of the three phases of clinical trials, the
manufacturer or "sponsor" of the drug may submit a New Drug
Application, or NDA, to the FDA.29 If the application is
sufficiently complete, the FDA will "file" the application and
begin its review process.30 In recent years, the median time from
the filing of an NDA to approval has been eight months for
"priority review" drugs-those which may provide -a
significant improvement in safety or efficacy of treatments for
the particular indication-and ten to twelve months for non-
priority review drugs.3 ' Critics of the FDA consider a delay of
even a few months to review a drug unjustifiable,3 2 however,
the review of a drug's safety and efficacy is an extraordinarily
complex undertaking. To provide a better understanding of the
scope and complexity of that review effort, Table 1 shown
below lists the twenty-two FDA staff, in addition to the team
leaders-all of whom were Ph.D.s, or M.D.s-who participated
26. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FULL PRESCRIBING INFORMATION: ONIVYDE 15 (2015),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2015/2077931bl.pdf. The study upon
which approval was based included 236 randomized patients. See id.
27. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FULL PRESCRIBING INFORMATION: ALDURAZYME 1 (2010),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2010/125058s01861bl.pdf.
28. Id. at 4.
29. See The FDA's Drug Review Process, upra note 11.
30. Id.
31. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CDER APPROVAL TIMES FOR PRIORITY AND STANDARD NDAS
AND BLAs: CALENDAR YEARS 1993-2016 (2016), https://www.fda.gov/media/102796/download
(showing the statistics of new priority and non-priority review requests for drugs).
32. Theory, Evidence and Examples of FDA Harm, FDAREVIEw.ORG., https://www.fdareview
.org/issues/theory-evidence-and-examples-of-fda-harm/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2019).
2019] 9
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in the review of Blincyto (blinatumomab), an antibody
developed by Amgen and approved for the treatment of a





Medical Officer Review Donna Przepiorka, MD, PhD
Pengfei Song, PhD, Ping Shao,
PhD, Vikram Sinha, PhD, Qi
Liu, PhD, and Nitin Mehrotra,
PhD
Chia-Wen Ko, PhD, and Lei
BiostatisticsiePh Nie, PhD
Brenda J. Gehrke, PhD, Haw-
Pharmacology/Toxicology Jyh Chui, PhD, Tiffany K Ricks,
PhD, Christopher M Sheth,
PhD
Immunogenicity Laura Salazar-Fontana, PhD,
and Susan Kirshner, PhD
ivision of Monoclonal Zing Zhou, PhD, Deborah




OC/OMPQ/DGMPA/BMAB PhD, Reyes Candau-Chacon,
PhD, and Patricia Hughes, PhD
DRISK/Office of Medication
Error Prevention and Risk Carolyn L. Yancey, MD
Management/OSE/CDER
Project Manager Kris Kolibab, PhD
33. ALBERT DEISSEROTH, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, CROss DISCIPLINE TEAM
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After reviewing all of the data, including the design of the
Phase 3 trials and the results of those trials, the FDA may
request an advisory committee meeting.35 Advisory committees
enable the FDA to obtain the opinion of independent experts on
particular scientific, technical, or policy issues raised in
connection with the application.36 At the end of the review, the
FDA will either approve the application or send the applicant a
Complete Response Letter (CRL) detailing the reasons for the
denial.37 The CRL may require relatively minor additional
action by the sponsor, such as revising the statistical analysis of
some of the data, requesting additional clinical trials, or, in the
worst case from a sponsor's perspective, stating that the data
does not indicate that the benefits of the drug outweigh the risks
of the drug.38 The FDA's approval of a drug includes the
approval of a drug's labeling, detailing the "Full Prescribing
Information" relied upon by physicians, as well as summaries
of the drug's mechanism of action, its pharmacology, and the
clinical trial evidence supporting the drug's approval.39 This full
prescribing information is then available on the FDA's
website.40 While the studies that provided the basis for the
FDA's approval are often available in the published literature,
this full prescribing information is the "official" source of
information about a drug for physicians.41
35. See Advisory Committees: Critical to the FDA's Product Review Process, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-information-consumers/advisory-committees-
critical-fdas-product-review-process (last updated May 4, 2016); see also What is an FDA Advisory
Committee?, supra note 7.
36. Learn About FDA Advisory Committees, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov
/patients/leam-about-patient-affairs-staff/leam-about-fda-advisory-commnittees (last updated
June 21, 2018).
37. 21 C.F.R. § 314.110(a) (2018).
38. Id. § 314.125(b) (listing reasons why FDA may refuse to approve an NDA).
39. See id. § 314.105; see also Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3921, 3926 (Jan. 24, 2006).
40. See Drugs@FDA: FDA Approved Drug Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).
41. Cf Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 335-36 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding the
First Amendment rights of drug companies to provide physicians with unofficial non-
misleading information not reviewed by the FDA). Henney explains why the full prescribing
information database exists today. Id.
11
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III. CURRENT APPROACHES TO PRE-APPROVAL ACCESS AND
ACCELERATED APPROVAL FOR DRUGS FOR CRITICALLY ILL
PATIENTS
The FDA has always been in the difficult position of being
statutorily required to approve new drugs on the basis of
sufficient evidence of their safety and efficacy on the one hand
and meeting the needs of critically ill patients on the other.42 It
is not hard to understand why patients who have been given a
terminal diagnosis might be willing to try anything to find a
drug that could provide them with a real chance at survival. It
has always been hard to understand why the FDA would ever
stand in the way of those desperate patients trying anything to
survive; as a result, there has always been enormous pressure
on the FDA simply to get out of the way. In response, the FDA
has always had a variety of programs to allow access to
unapproved drugs "for patients with serious or immediately
life-threatening diseases or conditions who lack therapeutic
alternatives.""
The FDA's pre-approval access programs are all grounded in
the statutory authority provided by provisions of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 45 Nevertheless, the
FDA, Congress, and state governments have taken several
42. See Delivering Promising New Medicines Without Sacrificing Safety and Efficacy, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-voices-perspectives-fda-leadership-
and-experts/delivering-promising-new-medicines-without-sacrificing-safety-and-efficacy (last
updated Aug. 27, 2019) ("[The FDA] must balance timely patient access to important new
medicines with assuring they meet key standards. These standards exist to make sure that
approved drugs have a high chance of helping those who use them. Medicines ultimately must
lead to overall improvements in how patients feel, function, or survive.").
43. See, e.g., Remarks by President Trump at S.204, "Right to Try" Bill Signing, WHITE HOUSE
(May 30, 2018, 12:31 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
president-trump-s-204-right-try-bill-signing/ ("But [the FDA approval process is] still a process
that takes years. Now it takes up to 15 years; even 20 years, some of these treatments are
going. But for many years, patients, advocates, and lawmakers have fought for this
fundamental freedom. And as I said, incredibly, they couldn't get it.").
44. See EXPANDED ACCESS, supra note 6, at 2.
45. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2018).
12 [Vol. 12:1
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additional actions beyond these programs,46 spurred by the
widespread but inaccurate perception that the FDA is slower to
approve drugs than agencies in other countries47 and that it is
difficult and time consuming for a critically ill patient's
physician to obtain the FDA's approval to access a drug outside
of a clinical trial. These actions include Right to Try laws,48
accelerated access to experimental drugs,49 and breakthrough
drug approval.50 Each of these approaches to earlier access for
critically ill patients is discussed in the following sections.
A. Right to Try
One of the responses to the pressure from patients has been
the enactment of Right to Try laws.51 In May of 2018, President
Trump signed into law the Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello,
Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017.52
State and federal Right to Try laws are generally based on the
model legislation promoted by the libertarian Goldwater
Institute and authorize drug companies whose drugs have
"successfully completed phase 1" to distribute their drugs to
any patient whose physician certifies that the patient has a
46. Robert Pear & Sheila Kaplan, Senate Passes F.D.A. Funding and 'Right to Try' Drug Bills,
N.Y. TIES, Aug. 4, 2017, at A15, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/us/politics/fda-senate-
experimental-drugs-terminally-ill-patients.html.
47. Melissa Healy, Speed Up Drug Approvals at FDA? It's Already Faster than Europe's Drug
Agency, L.A. TIMEs (Apr. 6, 2017, 11:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci
-sn-fda-european-medicine-20170405-story.html.
48. See discussion infra Section I.A.
49. See infra Section U.B.
50. See infra Section U.C.
51. See generally Julie A. Jacob, Questions of Safety and Fairness Raised as Right-to-Try Movement
Gains Steam, 314 JAMA 758 (2015) (discussing responsiveness of Right to Try laws and their
implications on manufacturers); Rebecca Dresser, The "Right to Try" Investigational Drugs:
Science and Stories in the Access Debate, 93 TEx. L. REV. 1631 (2015) (discussing real-life and policy
implications of enacted Right to Try laws and tension between liberal access to investigational
drugs and restrictive access); Alison Bateman-House & Christopher T. Robertson, The Federal
Right to Try Act of 2017-A Wrong Turn for Access to Investigational Drugs and the Path Forward,
178 JAMA 321 (2018) (arguing that Right to Try laws are perilous to patients and create
immunity for physicians and manufacturers who act negligently).
52. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try
Act of 2017, Pub.L. No. 115-176, 132 Stat. 1372 (2018).
13
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disease that "will soon result in death," even if treated with
available approved treatments.5 Despite their popularity and
adoption by many states and the federal government, Right to
Try laws are unlikely to have any meaningful effect for a variety
of reasons;5 primarily, because the right of the patient to try an
experimental drug does not mean an obligation to provide (or
sell at cost, in fact) on the part of pharmaceutical companies
developing the sought-after drug.55 Right to Try laws are not
fundamentally different in this regard from the FDA's existing
program for individual patient access to experimental drugs.56
Drug companies have already shown they are unwilling to
provide drugs outside of clinical trials under the existing
program for a number of reasons.5 7 First, providing the drug can
be administratively burdensome for the companies and
logistically difficult if the drug is being made in small quantities
for purposes of meeting the clinical trial needs.5 8 Second,
granting such requests can make it more difficult for companies
to enroll patients in the clinical trials necessary to determine the
drug's safety and efficacy.59 Finally, although the manufacturer
53. Right to Try Model Legislation, GOLDWATER INST., https://goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/cms page media/2016/1/5/GoldwaterInstituteRighttoTryModel.pdf (last
visited Sept. 19, 2019).
54. See, e.g., Alison Bateman-House, Kelly McBride Folkers & Arthur Caplan, 'Right To Try'
Won't Give Patients Access to Experimental Drugs. Here's what Will, HEALTH AFF.: HEALTH AFF.
BLOG (May 3, 2017), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2017/05/03/right-to-try-wont-give-patients-
access-to-experimental-drugs-heres-what-will/ (explaining how for-profit companies "would
be inclined to avoid" the risk of causing "severe adverse events" in patients using the expanded
access given by Right to Try, as well as "financial and personnel constraints" small companies
may have, which would not allow them to offer expanded access to patients).
55. Steven Joffe & Holly Fernandez-Lynch, Federal Right-to-Try Legislation-Threatening the
FDA's Public Health Mission, 378 NEw ENG. J. MED. 695, 697 (2018).
56. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.8 (2019); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CHARGING FOR INVESTIGATIONAL
DRUGS UNDER AN IND-QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2016),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances
/ucm351264.pdf; see also Dresser, supra note 51, at 1646-47.
57. Jonathan Darrow et al., Practical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in Expanded Access to
Investigational Drugs, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 279, 281 (2015) [hereinafter Practical, Legal & Ethical
Issues]; see also Dresser, supra note 51, at 1646-47.
58. See Practical, Legal & Ethical Issues, supra note 57, at 281.
59. Id.
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is allowed to charge a price sufficient to cover its costs,0
determining such a price and revealing it makes it more
difficult to justify the subsequent inevitably much higher price
post-approval, a problem that is magnified in an era of
increasing demands that pharmaceutical companies justify the
prices of their drugs.61 The new Right to Try Act of 2017,62
however well-intentioned, fails to remedy any of these practical
obstacles.
B. Accelerated Access to Experimental Drugs
While Right to Try statutes are, at best, of minor significance
to desperately ill patients (and, at worst, a false illusion of
hope), other already available mechanisms to accelerate access
to such patients do have a significant impact and have resulted
in widespread early or accelerated access to a significant
number of drugs.63 These mechanisms for accelerated access can
be divided into two categories: mechanisms for access to
experimental drugs prior to approval and mechanisms for
accelerating approval.
1. FDA provisions for access prior to approval
In the "prior to approval" category, the barriers to individual
patient access have already been discussed. However, in
addition to single patient access requests, the FDA regulations
provide for expanded access to experimental drugs in several
additional categories:
60. Id.
61. Andrew Pollack, Drug Prices Soar, Prompting Calls for Justification, N.Y. TIMES, July 23,
2015, at B1, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/business/drug-companies-pushed-from-far-
and-wide-to-explai-high-prices.html.
62. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try
Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-176, 132 Stat. 1372 (2018).
63. See infra Sections III.B.1, U.B.2.
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* Individual Patient Expanded Access, Including
for Emergency Use (also referred to as single
patient expanded access)
1) Individual patient expanded access IND
a) Individual patient expanded access
IND for emergency use
2) Individual patient expanded access protocol
a) Individual patient expanded access
protocol for emergency use
* Intermediate-Size Patient Population Expanded
Access
1) Intermediate-size patient population
expanded access IND
2) Intermediate-size patient population
expanded access protocol
* Treatment IND or Treatment Protocol
1) Treatment IND
2) Treatment protocolM
The FDA provides updates on the number of requests
received in each category and the number of requests the FDA
allowed to proceed.65 The numbers are substantial. Between
2009 and 2017 the FDA's Center for Drugs (CDER) and Center
for Biologics (CBER) received a total 4476 emergency single-
patient access requests and allowed 4444 of them to proceed -
64. EXPANDED ACCESS, supra note 6, at 6-7.
65. Note that all numbers discussed in this paragraph are taken from the source cited;
however, I calculated the total application and applications allowed. See Expanded Access
(Compassionate Use) Submission Data, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov
/newsevents/publichealthfocus/expandedaccesscompassionatese/ucm443572.htm#Expanded
AccessIND1 (last updated May 20, 2019).
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more than 99%.66 In those same years, CDER and CBER received
5980 non-emergency single patient access requests and allowed
5931 to proceed, which, again, is more than 99%. There are
similar rates of allowance for the other categories of expanded
approval access, which include intermediate size INDs and
intermediate size protocols.67 The FDA's programs for pre-
approval access to critically-needed drugs, while far from the
unrestricted open-access desired by the Abigail Alliance and
other libertarian groups,8 have proven to provide a
meaningful, rapid, and efficient means of access for a significant
number of patients.69
2. Accelerated approval
While expanded access through the FDA's single patient,
intermediate-size, and treatment access provisions provide
access to drugs prior to approval, far more patients have
obtained access through the FDA's efforts to accelerate
approval of drugs for serious diseases.70 The FDA has a number
of programs in place to help get drugs to patients sooner by
approving drugs more quickly.71 Some, such as the Fast Track72
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495
F.3d 695, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (denying terminally ill patients the open access to experimental
drugs that the Alliance advocated for because the FDA had a "rational basis for ensuring . . .
knowledge about the risks and benefits of . .. a drug").
69. See EXPANDED ACCESS, supra note 6, at 21.
70. See Novel Drugs Summary 2015, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs
/new-drugs-fda-cders-new-molecular-entities-and-new-therapeutic-biological-products/novel
-drugs-summary-2015 (last updated Jan. 12, 2016) (explaining FDA's "[m]ethods for expediting
innovative novel drugs to [the] market," including Fast Track, Breakthrough, Priority Review,
and Accelerated Approval).
71. Fast Track, Breakthrough Therapy, Accelerated Approval, Priority Review, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN, https://www.fda.gov/patients/leam-about-drug-and-device-approvals/fast-track-
breakthrough-therapy-accelerated-approval-priority-review (last updated Feb. . 23, 2018)
(explaining the FDA's "four distinct and successful approaches to making [drugs that treat
serious diseases] available as rapidly as possible").
72. See 21 U.S.C. § 356(b)(1) (2018); see also Fast Track, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/patients/fast-track-breakthrough-therapy-accelerated-approval-priority-
review/fast-track (last updated Jan. 4, 2018).
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and Priority Review73 programs, are aimed at facilitating
interaction between the FDA and the company developing the
drug in order to shorten development and review times
without significantly changing the evidentiary basis by which
drugs are approved.74 However, for those drugs that go through
the accelerated approva15 or breakthrough drug approval,76
there is a lower standard of evidence for approval and, as a
result, even less certainty provided to doctors and patients that
the benefits of the drugs do in fact exceed their risks.?
Accelerated approval has often been used for cancer drugs,
where the generally accepted endpoint to determine the real
clinical benefit for patients is the change in median overall
survival: Did patients taking the drug live longer than patients
who received a placebo and, if so, how much longer?78 Because
it would often take a considerable length of time to answer that
question, surrogate endpoints that can be measured sooner are
used to shorten Phase III trials and provide earlier availability
to patients.79 For example, to be used to obtain accelerated
approval, the surrogate endpoints, such as a decrease in the size
of patients' tumors, must be "reasonably likely" to predict
actual clinical benefit." For example, a commonly used
endpoint for the accelerated approval of a cancer drug is the
change in the median duration of "progression-free survival"
(often referred to as PFS).1 This is a measure of whether a drug
increases the length of time before the cancer begins to grow or
73. See 21 U.S.C. § 360ff (2018); see also Priority Review, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Fast/ucm405405.htm (last updated Jan. 4, 2018).
74. See sources cited supra notes 74-75.
75. 21 U.S.C. § 356(c) (2018).
76. Id. § 356(a).
77. See Bishal Gyawali & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Reinforcing the Social Compromise ofAccelerated
Approval, 15 NATURE REVIEWS CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 596, 596 (2018).
78. See Vinay Prasad et al., The Strength of Association Between Surrogate End Points and
Survival Oncology, 175 JAMA 1389, 1390, 1395 (2015) [hereinafter Strength ofAssociation].
79. See NCI Dictionary of Cancer Terms: Surrogate Endpoints, NAT'L CANCER INST., https://
www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/surrogate-endpoint (last visited
Sept. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Surrogate Endpoints].
80. 21 U.S.C. § 356(c)(1)(A) (2018).
81. See Strength of Association, supra note 78, at 1390.
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spread to other areas of the body or the patient dies (which may
occur despite no recording of "progression" for that patient).8 2
There is a positive correlation between time to progression and
overall survival for a number of cancers, and thus the endpoint
is "reasonably likely to predict" actual clinical benefit; however,
the magnitude of the effect, which is how much survival
increases, is not certain and is very often of a significantly lower
magnitude.83 For example, in one study of the increase in overall
survival in renal cell carcinoma, PFS had more than doubled
from five months to eleven months, but the magnitude of the
increase in overall survival eventually was determined to be
about 4.6 months, from 21.8 months to 26.4 months, a far
smaller percentage increase.
In many cases, drugs approved on the basis of PFS produced
no improvement in overall survival.? For example, Avastin
(bevacizumab) was being used as a first-line treatment for
metastatic breast cancer for three years before the FDA ordered
that indication to be withdrawn.86 The post-approval data
provided clear evidence that the increase in PFS that had
supported Avastin's accelerated approval had failed to
translate into any increase whatsoever in overall survival and
caused significant adverse effects.87 Despite that evidence, the
82. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLINICAL TRIAL ENDPOINTS FOR APPROVAL OF CANCER
DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 10 (2018), https://www.fda.gov
/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/ucm071590.pdf ( efining PFS "as the time from randomization
until objective tumor progression or death, whichever occurs first") [hereinafter ENDPOINTS:
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY].
83. 21 U.S.C. § 356(c)(1)(A); see also Darius N. Lakdawalla et al., Predicting Real-World
Effectiveness of Cancer Therapies Using Overall Survival and Progression-Free Survival from Clinical
Trials: Empirical Evidence for the ASCO Value Framework, 20 VALUE HEALTH 866, 874 (2017).
84. Robert J. Motzer et al., Overall Survival and Updated Results for Sunitinib Compared with
Interferon Alfa in Patients with Metastatic Renal Cell Carcinoma, 27 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3584,
3589 (2009).
85. See Strength of Association, supra note 78, at 1390 (using bevacizumab as an example).
86. Final Decision on Withdrawal of Breast Cancer Indication for AVASTIN (Bevacizumab)
Following Public Hearing, 77 Fed. Reg. 11,554, 11,554-11,555 (Feb. 27, 2012) ("Withdrawal of
AVASTIN's breast cancer indication was effective November 18, 2011.").
87. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DOC. No. FDA-2010-
N-0621-0544, PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW APPROVAL FOR THE BREAST CANCER INDICATION FOR
AVASTIN (BEVACIZUMAB): DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER 33-41 (2011).
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drug's sponsors, Genentech and Roche, unsuccessfully
appealed the decision to the Commissioner of the FDA,88 and
Medicare continued to reimburse its use in the face of patient
pressures.89 In at least one case, such a drug actually decreased
overall survival.9o Gemtuzumab ozogamicin was on the market
for ten years before it was withdrawn after further studies
showed that the drug was ineffective and actually increased
mortality.91
C. Breakthrough Drugs
The most recent addition to the efforts to further accelerate
access for patients with serious or life-threatening diseases is
the category of breakthrough drugs. Breakthrough drugs may
be approved on the basis of preliminary clinical evidence that the
drug may provide a substantial improvement over existing
therapies on at least one clinically significant endpoint.92
Approval of new drugs on the basis of preliminary clinical
evidence that "may" correlate with meaningful benefit allows
doctors to prescribe drugs even earlier in the drug development
process than accelerated access based on surrogate markers that
are "reasonably likely to" correlate with clinically relevant
measures.93 In the views of at least some commentators, this
lowering of the standard for entry into the marketplace goes a
step too far.94
The FDA's approval of eteplirsen, a new antisense drug for
Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy (DMD), is perhaps the most
88. Id. at 40-41.
89. See Stacie B. Dusetzina et al., How Do Payers Respond to Regulatory Actions? The Case of
Bevacizumab, 11 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 313-14 (2015). It is beyond the scope of this article to address
the issue of whether or not patients should be free to buy drugs that are known to have no
benefit and have significant adverse ffects.
90. Jonathan J. Darrow et al., New FDA Breakthrough-Drug Category-Implications for Patients,
370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1252, 1254 (2014) [hereinafter New FDA Breakthrough-Drug Category].
91. Id.
92. 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(1) (2018).
93. Id. § 356(c)(1)(A).
94. See, e.g., New FDA Breakthrough-Drug Category, supra note 90, at 1255.
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dramatic example of a "breakthrough" drug approved on the
basis of very little evidence.95 DMD is a devastating illness
affecting children that causes muscle weakness, atrophy, and
ultimately death.96 No effective treatments for this terrible
disease have ever been approved.97 It is easy to understand why
patient groups would press to approve the drug even without
any evidence of functional or clinical improvement.98 The
advisory committee previously had recommended against
approving the drug by a vote of seven to three with three
abstentions.9 The FDA's reviewers had not only concluded that
there was insufficient evidence that the drug worked, but one
of the reviewers actually appealed FDA Center Director Janet
Woodcock's decision to approve the drug.100
The drug is now being sold on the market at a cost of $300,000
per patient per year, even though it will be years until
additional clinical trials can provide substantial evidence of
95. See FDA Grants Accelerated Approval to First Drug for Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 19, 2016, 3:43 PM), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-
announcements/fda-grants-accelerated-approval-first-drug-duchenne-muscular-dystrophy
[hereinafter Accelerated Approval for DMD].
96. Id.
97. Cf. Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy (DMD), MUSCULAR DYSTROPHY ASS'N, https://www
.mda.org/disease/duchenne-muscular-dystrophy/medical-management (last visited Sept. 16,
2019) (noting that although DMD currently has no cure, "the use of available treatments can
help maintain comfort and function and prolong life").
98. Accelerated Approvalfor DMD, supra note 95 ("The accelerated approval of Exondys 51 is
based on the surrogate endpoint of dystrophin increase in skeletal muscle observed in some
Exondys 51-treated patients.").
99. Andrew Pollack, Advisers to FDA Vote Against Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy Drug, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2016, at B, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/26/business/muscular-dystrophy
-drug-fda-sarepta-eteplirsen.html.
100. ROBERT M. CALIFF, DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NDA
206488, SCIENTIFIC DISPUTE REGARDING ACCELERATED APPROVAL OF SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS
ETEPLIRSEN -COMMISSIONER DECISION (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov
/drugsatfdadocs/nda/2016/206488_summary%20reviewRedacted.pdf (memorandum of FDA
Commissioner Robert M. Califf, M.D. to CDER Director Janet Woodcock); see also Heidi
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whether or not the drug actually improves patients' lives.01 The
$300,000 per year cost of providing patients the drug would be
a terrible waste of our healthcare dollars if further clinical trials
fail to show the drug actually works. On the other hand, if the
further clinical trials show significant therapeutic benefit to
Duchenne patients, the failure of insurers to provide coverage
in the interim would have caused unnecessary suffering and
death to patients who had been unable to pay for the drug. As
of this writing, it appears that insurers are reluctant to cover
Eteplirsen and other drugs that have received accelerated
approval.102
An examination of the data supporting two other drugs
recently approved by the breakthrough standard of
"preliminary clinical evidence" that the drugs "may" provide
significant benefit further illustrates the vague nature of
evidence sufficient to allow marketing of the drug.103 There have
been two breakthrough drugs that received their original
marketing approval for overlapping multiple myeloma
indications-Empliciti and Darzalex.' As the FDA summary
review of Darzalex stated, "[m]ultiple myeloma remains a
mostly incurable disease with only a few patients who receive
an allogeneic transplant [and were] cured of their disease."105
Darzalex was approved on November 16, 2015, for "treatment
of patients with multiple myeloma who have received at least
three prior lines of therapy, including a proteasome inhibitor
101. See Katie Thomas, Insurers Battle Families Over Costly Drug for Fatal Disease, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 2017, at Al, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/22/health/duchenne-muscular-
dystrophy-drug-exondys-51.html.
102. Rawson, supra note 2.
103. Jeremy Puthumana, Joshua D. Wallach & Joseph S. Ross, Clinical Trial Evidence
Supporting FDA Approval of Drugs Granted Breakthrough Therapy Designation, 320 JAMA 301, 301-
03 (2018); see also Carolyn Y. Johnson, The Truth About 'Breakthrough' Drugs, WASH. POST (July
17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2018/07/17/the-truth-
about-breakthrough-drugs/ ("[E]fforts to speed up drug approval have been successful but
come with a trade-off: uncertainty.").
104. Novel Drugs Summary 2015, supra note 70.
105. ANN T. FARRELL, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RES., SUMMARY REVIEW, APPLICATION
No. 7610360RIG1S000 3 (2015), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda-docs/nda/2015
/7610360riglsOOOSumR.pdf [hereinafter SUMMARY REVIEW: DARZALEX].
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(PI) and an immunomodulatory agent, or who did not respond
to a PI and an immunomodulatory agent."1o Empliciti received
a somewhat broader approval two weeks later, on November
30, 2015, for "treatment of patients with multiple myeloma who
have received one to three prior therapies."107 So any patient
who meets the criteria for treatment with Darzalex would also
meet the criteria for treatment with Empliciti. The variance
between those two descriptions of patients for whom the drug
is indicated is largely a function of the choice the drugs'
sponsors made in deciding on the patients to include in the
Phase 3 clinical trials.1os What could a doctor treating a patient
with multiple myeloma and three prior therapies convey other
than the fact that the drug may work for some patients and not
others, and may work for some unknown but limited period of
time?
The data on which each drug was approved is different.
Empliciti was approved on the basis of a significant difference
in progression-free survival (PFS), which, as discussed above,
is a commonly used endpoint that has some reasonable
correlation with improvement in overall survival.109 At the time
of approval, the data supporting Empliciti's market entry was
based on a 646 patient trial, where patients were randomized to
106. Press Release, Janssen Biotech, Inc., Johnson & Johnson, DARZALEX @(daratumumab)
Approved by U.S. FDA: First Human Anti-CD38 Monoclonal Antibody Available for the
Treatment of Multiple Myeloma (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.jnj.com/media-center/press-
releases/darzalex-daratumumab-approved-by-us-fda-first-human-anti-cd38-monoclonal-
antibody-available-for-the-treatment-of-multiple-myeloma (footnote omitted).
107. RICHARD PAZDUR, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RES., APPROVAL PACKAGE,
APPLICATION No. 7610350RIG1s000 1 (2015), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfdadocs
/appletter/2015/7610350riglsOOOtr.pdf.
108. Compare U.S. NAT'L LIBRARY OF MED., Phase III Study of Lenalidomide and Dexamethasone
with or Without Elotuzumab to Treat Relapsed or Refractory Multiple Myeloma (ELOQUENT - 2),
NIH, https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT01239797 (lastupdated Nov. 1, 2018), with Janssen
Research & Development, LLC, Study Comparing Daratumumab, Lenalidomide, and Dexamethasone
with Lenalidomide and Dexamethasone in Participants with Previously Untreated Multiple Myeloma,
NIH, https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT02252172 (last updated Mar. 8, 2019) (using
different sets of eligibility criteria, including different inclusion and exclusion criteria, in
determining whether to allow participant involvement in the specific studies).
109. See ANN T. FARRELL, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RES.., SUMMARY REVIEW,




receive either Empliciti plus a regimen of two other drugs or the
two drug regimen alone.-1o Patients in the trial who received
Empliciti had a 4.5 month longer median duration of
progression-free survival, and there was very preliminary
evidence of an increase in overall survival." The original
approval of Darzalex was based on the endpoint of overall
response rate (ORR), a less reliable marker of clinical
effectiveness,"' from a much smaller number of patients in two
single-arm trials, meaning there was no control group.113 In the
larger of those two studies involving one hundred and six
patients, thirty-one achieved an ORR with a median duration of
7.4 months, while fifteen patients (36%) of the forty-two
patients in the smaller trial achieved an ORR with a median
duration of 6.9 months.114 Given the grim prognosis for patients
with multiple myeloma, that change in ORR may be enough for
patients and doctors to evaluate whether or not taking those
drugs is worthwhile, but it is hardly enough for either patients
or payers to evaluate the actual clinical benefit of those drugs.115
For desperate patients, allowing the early approval of drugs
such as Empliciti and Darzalex provides those patients with a
degree of hope. However, providing that hope for drugs with
an unknown probability of real clinical benefit is a very
110. U.S. FooD & DRUG ADMIN., FULL PRESCRIBING INFORMATION: EMPLICITI 13, 15 (2015),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda-docs/abel/2015/761035s0001bl.pdf [hereinafter
FULL PRESCRIBING INFORMATION: EMPLICITI].
111. Id. at 16-17.
112. See ENDPOINTS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 82, at 3-7.
113. See SUMMARY REVIEw: DARZALEX, supra note 105. Note that the endpoint of overall
response rate (ORR) used in the Darzalex study is, somewhat confusingly, a variation on the
endpoint of objective response rate.
114. Id.
115. Both drugs now have data showing an improvement in overall survival at twelve
months, while Empliciti has longer term data that shows the overall survival (OS) advantage
persisting but narrowing considerably for several years. See FULL PRESCRIBING INFORMATION:
EMPLICITI, supra note 110, at fig.1; see also Meletios A. Dimopoulos et al., Daratumumab,
Lenalidomide, and Dexamethasone for Multiple Myeloma, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1319, 1326-27
(2016). Longer term data on OS for Darzalex has not yet been published. At this point, doctors
and patients may have a reasonable amount of information on both drugs and the similar
increased likelihood of OS at 1 year and insurers may have some basis for determining the value
of the drugs and negotiating prices.
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expensive gamble for patients and their insurers. The next part
of this article discusses the role of information about drug safety
and efficacy in the pharmaceutical marketplace.
IV. THE FDA's ROLE IN PROVIDING INFORMATION TO THE
PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET
Markets are made up of buyers and sellers, and a familiar
concept of basic economics is that the price in the marketplace
reflects the balance between supply and demand.116 Demand in
the pharmaceutical market depends on the availability to
buyers, such as insurance companies, doctors, and patients, of
information about a drug's benefit and risks.117 Buyers will
increase demand, and be willing to pay more, for drugs that
provide a significant expectation of a truly meaningful clinical
benefit-such as a significant increase in the median duration
of survival or a substantial reduction in pain-than for drugs
which offer much less clinical benefit-such as a very small
increase in the median duration of survival or a very minor
reduction in pain.118 Most of the information patients need to
make an informed decision regarding use of the drug, and
insurers need to decide how much they are willing to pay for a
drug, comes from the data produced in the clinical trials
required to obtain FDA approval of a new drug.
Even though the results of the years of preclinical and clinical
testing of a drug required for FDA approval is summarized in
the full prescribing information, many questions remain
unanswered. While the FDA has determined that the benefits of
116. Econ 150: Supply and Demand, BYU IDAHO, https://courses.byui.edu/econ_150/econ
150_oldsite/lesson 03.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2019) ("A market consists of those
individuals who are willing and able to purchase the particular good and sellers who are willing
and able to supply the good. The market brings together those who demand and supply the
good to determine the price.").
117. See, e.g., David Granlund & Niklas Rudholm, Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical
Prices: Theory and Evidence, 73 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 230, 230-31 (2011).
118. See Jonathan J. Darrow, Pharmaceutical Gatekeepers, 47 IND. L. REV. 363, 376 (2014) ("Like
all market participants, patients have a natural incentive to act in their own best interests, which
in the present context means consuming medicines that possess the greatest efficacy and do the
least harm." (parentheses omitted)).
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the drug (or likely or potential benefits for accelerated or
breakthrough approvals) exceed the risks of the drug for the
targeted patient population, a patient may want answers to
various other questions before taking a drug: Is it better than
the other drugs that are used to treat my condition? Is this drug
safer than the other drugs? Who is most likely to respond to this
drug, and am I likely to be one of them? Am I more or less likely
to suffer the most serious adverse effects? If this drug is not as
safe as other drugs, is it likely to be sufficiently more effective
for my condition than the other drugs to justify any increased
risk?
Most patients would assume that their doctors have the
answers to these questions about the drugs they recommend,
but even for the majority of drugs that go through the normal,
non-accelerated review process, it is unlikely that there are
answers to most of these questions. In the "normal" drug
review process, Phase III trials measure a drug's effectiveness
in patients who meet the precisely-described criteria for patient
inclusion and exclusion119 on an endpoint or outcome that is
considered to be significant for patients. This provides some
assurance that the benefits of the drug exceed its risks for the
patients whose condition and health is the same as the subjects
in the clinical trial, which is all doctors or patients can be
reasonably confident about for most drugs.120 There generally is
119. See Russel E. Glasgow, Edward Lichtenstein & Alfred C. Marcus, Why Don't We See
More Translation of Health Promotion Research to Practice? Rethinking the Efficacy-to-Effectiveness
Transition, 93 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 1261, 1262 (2003) (discussing Phase III studies testing drug
effectiveness).
120. Id. ("Phase III studies can be conducted in settings and with samples that will 'optimize
interpretation of efficacy."'). However, recently some drugs have been designed to treat
patients with specific genetic mutations. Kalydeco, for example, which is approved for patients
with specific mutations in the Cystic Fibrosis Transmembrane Receptor, has been designed to
treat patients with Cystic Fibrosis. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FULL PRESCRIBING
INFORMATION: KALYDECO 1 (2017), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda-docs/label
/2017/203188s026,207925s0051bl.pdf. In these "targeted therapies," although the ultimate degree
of effectiveness may still not be known, the patients most likely to benefit are identifiable by
genetic testing. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., DEVELOPING TARGETED
THERAPIES IN Low-FREQUENCY MOLECULAR SUBSETS OF A DISEASE: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 1
(2018), https://www.fda.gov/media/117173/download (proposing that "certain targeted
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no assurance that a drug will work for a particular patient, or
work better than other drugs for the same condition, or even
that a particular patient will not suffer the worst of the drug's
adverse effects; but, at least, the approximate likelihood of risk
and benefit could be known.'2 While a doctor may have had
experiences with patients who have taken a drug, and the
doctor may have beliefs about the answers to all the patients'
questions, the fact is that doctors' experiences are, in the
language of science, anecdotal and not a reliable basis for
assessing a drug's benefits and risks when given to a large
number of patients.122
It might be relatively easy for a pig farmer to inspect a pig and
feel confident about the purchase before buying. However,
drugs are a different story. To know whether or not a drug is
effective requires a great deal of time, effort, and money-years
of testing and hundreds of millions or billions of dollars.123 In
the marketplace for drugs, the FDA's statutory mission is to
ensure that adequate evidence has been generated to provide
some confidence that a drug's benefits exceed its risks when
used according to the FDA-approved label.124 The FDA really
has no authority to require more information than that.
The relationship between adequate information and the
ability of the market to set prices is fundamental.12 In the
context of drugs, the problem for the market is clear. The
therapies may be effective in multiple groups of patients who have different underlying
molecular alterations," suggesting that genetic testing would help identify patients who the
treatment would be most effective for) [hereinafter TARGETED THERAPIES].
121. See TARGETED THERAPIES, supra note 120, at 4-6 (showing that although the evidence
found cannot assure the effectiveness of the drug-because it needs to be generalized over a
population of people-it is still helpful information to have).
122. See Steven Novella, The Role of Anecdotes in Science-Based Medicine, SCIENCE-BASED MED.
(Jan. 30, 2008), https://sciencebasedmedicine.org/the-role-of-anecdotes-in-science-based-
medicine/.
123. TUFTS CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV., Cost to Develop and Win Marketing Approval for
a New Drug is $2.6 Billion, TUFTS U. (Nov. 18, 2014), https://staticl.squarespace.com/static/
5a9eb0c8e2ccd1158288d8dc/t/5ac66adc758d46b001a996d6/1522952924498/pr-coststudy.pdf
[hereinafter TUFTS U.].
124. Development & Approval Process (Drugs), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ (last updated Oct. 28, 2019).
125. See, e.g., Granlund & Rudholm, supra note 117, at 231.
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standard drug approval process generates at least the most
basic information about the effectiveness of a drug. However,
in the case of accelerated approval, there is even less of the
information that patients and doctors need.126 Critics of the
FDA's approval process often argue that the need to speed up
the availability of drugs to critically ill patients outweighs the
value of the traditional approach to drug testing and approval,
and physicians and patients can sort out the answers to their
questions about drugs after the drug is widely available.127 This
argument places the value of the FDA's expertise and the
traditional approval process squarely at issue.
V. IS THE FDA's PROCESS REALLY NECESSARY OR COULD A FREE
MARKET WORK AS WELL?
As one recent commentary by Chandra and Sachs stated: "It
is fashionable in some circles to say that 'a Yelp for drugs'
would be superior to the FDA."128 However, while reviews of a
restaurant may be useful in deciding whether or not to eat there,
reviews of drugs by patients have far less value. Even reviews
by physicians are far from a reasonably reliable resource.12 9 ne
rather extraordinary study, examining all articles published
from 2001-2010 in The New England Journal ofMedicine-perhaps
the most widely read and influential journal in American
Medicine'3 -found 363 of the articles published in that ten-year
period reported on clinical trials examining the evidence for an
126. See New FDA Breakthrough-Drug Category, supra note 90, at 1252.
127. See, e.g., Caroline Chen, FDA Repays Industry by Rushing Risky Drugs to
Market, PROPUBLICA (June 26, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/fda-repays-
industry-by-rushing-risky-drugs-to-market (criticizing industry influence on FDA drug
approval).
128. Amitabh Chandra & Rachel E. Sachs, An FDA Commissioner for the 21l Century, 376 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1, 1 (2017).
129. See Vinay Prasad et al., A Decade of Reversal: An Analysis of 146 Contradicted Medical
Practices, 88 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 790, 792 (2013) [hereinafter A Decade of Reversal].
130. NAT'L INST. ENvTL. HEALTH SciS., High Impact Journals: Superfund Research Program,
NIH-, https://tools.niehs.nih.gov//srp/publications/highimpactjournals.cfm (last visited Nov. 12,
2019).
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existing medical practice. 131 For example, one study examined
the efficacy and safety of dopamine in the treatment of shock.132
Dopamine had been widely used to treat shock and was even
one of the two treatments recommended by consensus
guidelines.33 However, when a controlled study of dopamine's
safety and efficacy in treating shock was finally done, it found
that treatment with dopamine was actually associated with a
greater risk of arrhythmias and an increase in the risk of
death.3 The astonishing conclusion of the study was that of the
363 articles that examined a preexisting and widely-used
medical practice, only 138 provided evidence that supported
the practice, while 146 found that the practice either provided
no benefit or actually led to worse outcomes.35 Clearly a Yelp
review system for medical treatments that relied on the
opinions of physicians would be of questionable value, and it is
difficult to imagine that using online patients' reviews would
be any better.
Some libertarians would do away altogether with the FDA's
role in approving the safety and efficacy of new drugs.136
Proponents of this extreme view believe that the cost of meeting
FDA requirements is a major factor in the high cost of medicines
and, even worse, that patients die because the process of
obtaining FDA approval delays access to critically needed
drugs.137 These anti-regulation, free-market advocates believe
131. See generally A Decade of Reversal, supra note 129 (highlighting the abundance of articles
providing evidence supporting widely used medical practices versus the abundance of articles
discounting the same widely used medical practices for not providing benefit or leading to
worse outcomes).
132. Id. app. at 27, n.133, https://www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/cms/10.1016/j.mayocp
.2013.05.012/attachment/4359ae39-8377-4a2a-9dl3-d3a6ec62cc68/mmc2.pdf (supplemental
appendix showing each of the reviewed articles for Prasad's analysis).
133. Yasser Sakr et al., Does Dopamine Administration in Shock Influence Outcome? Results of
the Sepsis Occurrence in Acutely Ill Patients (SOAP) Study, 34 CRITICAL CARE MED. 589, 589 (2006).
134. See id. at 594-95.
135. A Decade of Reversal, supra note 129, at 790, 791-93.
136. See, e.g., FDA and Drug Regulation, CATO INST., https://www.cato.org/research/fda-
drug-regulation (last visited Nov. 12, 2019) (proposing the political philosophy that individuals
should be able to "choose the medical treatments they think best").
137. Theory, Evidence and Examples of FDA Harm, supra note 32.
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that the determination of a drug's effectiveness should be left to
"free-market testing."Im While the problem of high-priced
drugs and the desperate plight of critically ill patients is very
real, the idea of some sort of Yelp or even a privately published
Consumer Reports for prescription drugs fails to answer how
the marketplace would provide the funds to cover the many
millions of dollars that well-designed trials cost.13 9
Although the role of scientific evidence and data in providing
decision-makers with the most reliable basis for their choices is
becoming an increasingly politicized issue,140 it is still generally
accepted within the scientific and medical community that the
"gold standard"141 of evidence about a drug is well-designed
randomized clinical trials in which the drug in question is
tested against a placebo or, in the case of a serious disease for
which a standard treatment exists, a placebo plus the standard
therapy.142 A well-designed clinical trial satisfies multiple
criteria, but primarily it provides a relatively clear and
replicable answer to the question the trial is designed to resolve:
is the drug effective or, in the cases of comparative effectiveness
trials, does the drug work better than the drug to which it is
being compared?143 No amount of individual physician
experience can really provide the same confidence in a drug's,
138. Healthcare, LIBERITARIANPARTY, https://www.1p.org/issues/healthcare/ (last visited
Nov. 8, 2019).
139. See Linda Martin et al., How Much Do Clinical Trials Cost?, 16 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG
DISCOVERY 381,381 (2017) ("For the trials in the data set, the median cost of conducting a study
from protocol approval to final clinical trial report was . . . $3.4 million for phase I trials
involving patients, $8.6 million for phase II trials and $21.4 million for phase m trials.").
140. Gordon Gauchat, Politicization of Science in the Public Sphere: A Study of Public Trust in
the United States, 1974 to 2010, 77 AM. Soc. REV. 167, 178 (2012).
141. Laura E. Bothwell et al., Assessing the Gold Standard -Lessons from the History of RCTs,
374 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2175, 2175 (2016).
142. See David W. Parke II, RCTs: The Gold Standard's Future, EYENET MAG., Feb. 2019, at 12
("Phase 3 RCTs constitute large scale studies of effectiveness, safety, dosage, and comparisons
to placebo or treatment alternatives.").
143. See The Basics, NATL INsTIrUES HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov/health-information/nih-
clinical-research-trials-you/basics (last updated Oct. 20, 2017).
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or procedure's, effectiveness. Well-designed clinical trials are
the core requirement for FDA approval of a new drug.'"
There are two key statutory provisions that describe the
FDA's role in approving the sale of new drugs and evaluating
the design of the trials. The first provision requires that
applicants seeking approval of a new drug provide "full reports
of investigations which have been made to show whether or not
such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in
use."145 The second provision sets a standard that those
"investigations" must meet:
adequate tests by all methods reasonably
applicable to show whether or not such drug is
safe for use ... [and] adequate and well-controlled
investigations, including clinical investigations, by
experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the
drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly
and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the
drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to
have.'"
The statute requires the FDA to determine whether or not the
clinical trials of a drug provide substantial evidence from which
experts would conclude that a drug is both safe and effective
and whether or not the clinical trials were reasonably designed
to provide good evidence or, in the language of the statute,
"substantial evidence."147
However, while it is the FDA's statutory role to ensure that
the clinical trials used to support the marketing of a drug are
well designed and provide adequate evidence that a drug's
benefits exceed its risks, that does not compel the conclusion
that the FDA's role in evaluating those studies and the evidence
144. Id.; see also The FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 11.
145. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2018).
146. Id. § 355(d) (emphasis added).
147. Id. ("Grounds for refusing application; approval of application; 'substantial evidence'
defined.").
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they provide is essential. Advocates of deregulation argue that
peer-reviewed publications can better and more efficiently
serve the need of physicians and patients for good information
without a requirement for FDA oversight or approval.148 This
argument rests entirely on a misplaced faith in the peer-review
system. Drug companies can all too easily design a study that is
very likely to give the desired result or that is lacking in
adequate controls or analytic rigor and yet will nevertheless be
published in a peer-reviewed journal, even a prestigious peer-
reviewed journal.149
One way to understand the difference between the rigor of
the FDA's "substantial evidence" approval standard and the
peer-review standard for journal publication is to look at recent
drugs that were denied FDA approval and the peer-reviewed
publications that preceded the FDA's rejection. For example, in
2018 Eli Lilly suffered a major setback when the FDA issued a
complete response letter denying approval to Lilly's oral
rheumatoid arthritis drug baracitinib.5 0 According to Lilly,
"[s]pecifically, the FDA indicated that additional clinical data
are needed to determine the most appropriate doses. The FDA
also stated that additional data are necessary to further
characterize safety concerns across treatment arms."1 5 ' The
FDA's rejection came despite the fact that two positive reports
of trials of the drug were published in The New England Journal
of Medicine just prior to the FDA's action.15 2 Similarly, Cempra
received a complete response letter from the FDA requiring
"additional clinical safety information" for approval of its
148. See Theory, Evidence and Examples of FDA Harm, supra note 32.
149. See Lexchin et al., supra note 8, at 1169-70.
150 See U.S. FDA Issues Complete Response Letter for Baricitinib, LILLY INV. (Apr. 14, 2017),
https://investor.ihlly.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD-1021392.
151. Id.
152. Mark C. Genovese et al., Baricitinib in Patients with Refractory Rheumatoid Arthritis, 374
NEw ENG. J.MED. 1243, 1251 (2016); Peter C. Taylor et al., Baricitinib Versus Placebo or Adalimumab
in Rheumatoid Arthritis, 376 NEw ENG. J. MED. 652, 660-61 (2017).
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antibiotic solithromycin53 despite the prestigious British
journal The Lancet publishing a favorable report of the results of
a major study of the drug in its journal for infectious diseases.'5
According to The Lancet Infectious Diseases article, "[t]he overall
safety profile of solithromycin was similar to that of
moxifloxacin," an already approved drug for the same
condition.155 In yet another example, in 2012 Amgen received a
complete response letter from the FDA refusing to approve
Amgen's drug XGEVA for castration-resistant prostate
cancer.156 According to Amgen:
The FDA determined that the effect on bone
metastases-free survival (BMFS) was of
insufficient magnitude to outweigh the risks
(including osteonecrosis of the jaw) of XGEVA in
the intended population, and requested data from
an adequate and well-controlled trial(s)
demonstrating a favorable risk-benefit profile for
XGEVA that is generalizable to the U.S.
population.17
The FDA's rejection of XGEVA came despite the conclusion of
the authors from another major study which determined
"denosumab is better than the established therapy, zoledronic
acid, for the delay or prevention of skeletal-related events in
153. Cempra Receives Complete Response Letter From FDA For Solithromycin NDAs,
GLOBENEWSWIRE (Dec. 29, 2016, 6:55 AM), https://globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2016/12/29
/902088/0/en/Cempra-Receives-Complete-Response-Letter-From-FDA-For-Solithromycin-
NDAs.html.
154. See generally Carlos M. Barrera et al., Efficacy and Safety of Oral Solithromycin Versus Oral
Moxifloxacin for Treatment of Community Acquired Bacterial Pneumonia: A Global, Double-Blind,
Multicentre, Randomised, Active-Controlled, Non-Inferiority Trial (SOLITARE-ORAL), 16 LANCET
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 421 (2016) (noting how solithromycin was "non-inferior," in terms of
efficacy and safety, to another approved medication (moxifloxacin) in treating community-
acquired bacterial pneumonia). .
155. Id. at 428.
156. Amgen Receives Complete Response Letter From FDA for XGEVA@ sBLA for Prevention of
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patients with advanced prostate cancer (panel)."158 This study
was also published in The Lancet.159
Lurie et al. published a study of companies' public statements
concerning the FDA's denial of approval for sixty-one drugs for
which the FDA issued complete response letters from 2008 to
2013.160 Although the study does not list the names of the
individual drugs, it would be surprising if the great majority of
the applications for approval had not been preceded by positive
reports on the drugs in the peer-reviewed literature. Companies
would hardly want to submit applications for new drug
approval based on studies that had not been evaluated by the
company as positive and had also been published in peer-
reviewed journals with a positive conclusion. There are only
two ways to look at the phenomenon of non-approvals in the
wake of positive assessments by the company and published
literature: either the FDA is acting arbitrarily and unreasonably
denying marketing approval to safe and effective drugs, or
alternatively, the FDA is adding an important objective and
independent level of scrutiny that ensures that drugs are
approved on the basis of adequate and reliable information
concerning their effectiveness and safety.
The question of whether or not the FDA is unreasonable in
turning down drugs or adding important value in their review
function is clearly an important one. While there is no way to
provide an absolute answer to that question, there is at least
some evidence of the added value of the FDA's review of drug
data that comes from the FDA's use of advisory committees in
158. Karim Fizazi et al., Denosumab Versus Zoledronic Acid for Treatment of Bone Metastases in
Men with Castration-Resistant Prostate Cancer: A Randomised, Double-Blind Study, 377 LANCET 813,
819 (2011).
159. Id.
160. See generally Peter Lurie et al., Comparison of Content of FDA Letters Not Approving
Applications for New Drugs and Associated Public Announcements from Sponsors: Cross Sectional
Study, 350 BRrT. MED. J. 1 (2015) (describing the non-public complete response letters by the FDA
when they did not approve marketing strategies by drug companies).
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the new drug approval process.161 Advisory committees are
used by the FDA to provide the agency with input into the drug
approval decision-making process from scientific and medical
experts outside the agency, as well as consumer and patient
advocates.162 The majority of members of FDA advisory
committees work on the front lines of research and clinical care
for patients in their areas21' The input from such leading
outside independent experts'6 certainly should be of real value
in scrutinizing the evidence of a drug's safety and efficacy.
Studies of the FDA's use of advisory committees support the
value of advisory committee review. There have been a number
of studies that examine the correlation between the FDA's final
decision and the recommendations of its advisory committees,
as well as the factors that appear to be most likely to lead to
161. See Philip Ma et al., FDA Advisory Committee Outcomes, MCKINSEY & CO. (2013),
https://www.mckinsey.com/-/media/McKinsey/dotcom/client s rvice/%20Public%2OSector
/Regulatory%20excellence/FDAadvisorycommitteeoutcomes.ashx (concluding that the
study of the advisory committees' methods supports the utility of similar bodies if used in the
pharmaceutical industry).
162. Membership Types, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov
/AdvisoryCommittees/AboutAdvisoryCommittees/ConimitteeMembership/MembershipType
s/default.htm (last updated Mar. 27, 2018).
163. See, e.g., Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Roster, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/OncologicDr
ugsAdvisoryCommittee/ucml07418.htm (last updated Sept. 9, 2019) (summarizing the
qualifications of each of the members of an example FDA advisory committee consistent with
the ratio of scientific members to other representatives seen in other committees); see also
Membership Types, supra note 162.
164. The membership of the Oncologic Drug Advisory Committee can serve as a useful
illustration of the kind of expertise that advisory committees bring to the FDA review process.
As of July 2019, the Oncologic Drug Advisory Committee membership included outside experts
in oncology from leading universities and cancer centers in the United States, as well as an
expert in biostatistics and a nonvoting industry representative. Oncologic Drugs Advisory
Committee Roster, supra note 163. The listed affiliations were University of Chicago, Food and
Drug Administration, University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, Robert H. Lurie
Comprehensive Cancer Center, Case Western Reserve University Cleveland Clinic Lerner
College of Medicine, Duke University Medical Center, National Institutes of Health National
Cancer Institute, Wake Forest University Health Sciences, Amgen Oncology (non-voting
industry representative), St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memorial Sloan-Kettering
Cancer Center, Massachusetts General Hospital, Duke University School of Medicine Duke
Adult Blood and Marrow Transplant Clinic, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center. Id.
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negative decisions by advisory committees and the FDA.165 One
study of advisory committee decision-making focused just on
the Oncologic Drug Advisory Committee (ODAC)-the
committee that is closest to the heart of the controversy over the
FDA's role as gatekeeper to potentially life-saving drugs
because it is concerned primarily with cancer drugs, including
those intended for patients with very limited chances of long-
term survival. 166 The members of the committee include cancer
researchers and clinicians who are at the front lines of the battle
for cancer patients' survival.167
It is difficult to argue that these leading cancer clinicians and
researchers would not be eager to add an important new drug
to the treatments they can offer desperate patients, yet the study
found that of eighty-two drugs considered by the ODAC
between 2000 and 2014, the committee voted against the
approval of exactly half and for the approval of half.'68 The FDA
approved all forty-one drugs that the ODAC recommended for
approval and also approved seven of the forty-one drugs for
which the ODAC had recommended denying or delaying
approval.169 On its face, this data supports two important
conclusions about the FDA's role in approving new drugs,
including those for serious or fatal diseases. First, despite the
165. See, e.g., Mark Senak, AdComm Recommendations - How Often FDA Does Not Follow
Them?, EYE ON FDA (Aug. 16, 2016), http://eyeonfda.com/2016/08/adcomm-recommendations-
how-often-fda-does-not-follow-them/ (analyzing the positive and negative outcomes of
advisory committee meetings from 2011 through 2016); Philip Ma et al., supra note 161
(analyzing public data to discover potential implications of limitations in advisory committee
meetings); Todd D. McIntyre, Mimi Pappas & James J. DiBiasi, How FDA Advisory Committee
Members Prepare and What Influences Them, 47 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 32, 32-35
(2012) (surveying current and former advisory committee members and concluding sponsors
"need to be clear, concise, and scientifically credible, and that some advisory committee
members need to be more uniformly prepared").
166. See Ariadna Tibau et al., Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Recommendations and
Approval of Cancer Drugs by the US Food and Drug Administration, 2 JAMA ONCOLOGY 744, 745,
748-49 (2016) ("[A]nalyz[ing] the influence of the Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee
(ODAC) on the FDA's oncologic drug approval process and factors associated with both ODAC
recommendations and final FDA approval.").
167. See Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Roster, supra note 163.
168. Tibau et al., supra note 166, at 744, 746.
169. See id. at 746.
[Vol. 12:136
2019] A NEW CONDITIONAL APPROVAL PATHWAY
fact that sponsors of such drugs clearly believe their data
supports approval and often have peer-reviewed publications
supporting their applications, independent experts from
outside the FDA who have not been involved in those studies
often conclude that there is inadequate evidence of the drugs'
safety and efficacy.170 Second, outside experts who actually treat
patients with those diseases are frequently more skeptical of the
evidence supporting a drug's safety and efficacy than the much-
maligned bureaucrats at the FDA. 71 Although it is commonly
believed that peer-reviewed literature can provide doctors and
patients with the information they need to allow the
marketplace to function, the advisory committee evidence
indicates that is not the case, as have numerous studies of
publication bias in the pharmaceutical industry.172 Peer-
reviewed publications simply do not have the objectivity or
rigor that the FDA, together with its advisory committees,
provides.173 The FDA adds significant value in serving as an
independent quality check of the evidence that supports a
drug's safety and efficacy.
VI. CONDITIONAL APPROVAL COULD ACCELERATE ACCESS,
REDUCE PRICES, AND MORE QUICKLY PROVIDE THE INFORMATION
THAT DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND PROVIDERS NEED
Part I of this Article noted that many critics of federal
regulation believe that FDA regulation could be completely
eliminated. Proponents of this extreme view believe that the
cost of meeting FDA requirements is a major factor in the high
cost of medicines, that those requirements are unnecessary, and
that the determination of a drug's effectiveness could be left to
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See Lexchin et al., supra note 8, at 1167-68. The authors review thirty different studies
to investigate the bias in the design and reporting of pharmaceutical industry-funded research.
173. Compare Lexchin et al., supra note 8, at 1169-70 (discussing the influence of
pharmaceutical manufacturers on the publication of negative studies), with Tibau et al., supra
note 166, at 746-47,749 (discussing the influence of FDA advisory committees on FDA approval
of new pharmaceuticals).
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a marketplace armed with the internet.17 4 While the problem of
high drug prices for new "specialty" drugs75 is very real, this
understanding of drug pricing and of the FDA's role is wrong
on both counts. The principal reason the prices of critically-
needed drugs are high is not because of the high costs of
development.176 Pharmaceutical companies set prices in the
same way that every for-profit business sets prices, based on
what the sellers believe the market will bear in order to
maximize profits.177 In turn, what the market will bear should
be based on the buyers' perception of the value of a drug, that
is the value of the health benefits attributable to a drug's
effectiveness. For example, a drug that offers a metastatic cancer
patient a significant chance of long-term survival would
command a higher price than a drug that offers those patients a
median increase in survival of only a few weeks.17s
However, accelerated access allows a drug to reach the
market quickly based on clinical trials that measure surrogate
174. FDA and Drug Regulation, supra note 136 ("In a free society, individuals should be free
to care for their physical well-being as they see fit, which includes the freedom to choose the
medical treatments they think best. Such liberty does not open the door for fraud or abuse any
more than does a free market in other products. In fact, informed consent by patients will
become more sophisticated as the market for information about medical treatments becomes
more free and open."). But see Chandra & Sachs, supra note 128, at 1 (criticizing the view that an
internet marketplace such as "a Yelp for drugs" could substitute for the FDA).
175. There are several different definitions of a specialty drug, however nearly all definitions
require that he drug be used for a serious or life-threatening condition and carries a high price.
See Specialty Medications, NAT'L PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES, https://www.pti-nps.com/nps
/index.php/specialty-medications/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2019).
176. See Vinay Prasad & Sham Mailankody, Research and Development Spending to Bring a
Single Cancer Drug to Market and Revenues After Approval, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1569, 1572-
73 (2017) (finding the "cost to develop a single oncologic drug ... is significantly [lower] than a
widely publicized figure of $2.7 billion").
177. See Ellen Licking & Susan Garfield, A Road Map to Strategic Drug Pricing, IN VIvo (Mar.
16, 2016), https://invivo.pharmamedtechbi.com/1V004481/A-Road-Map-To-Strategic-Drug-
Pricing ("It is time to acknowledge that our historical pricing model, which is built on unit-
based pricing, is too one- dimensional for the marketplace's current needs. It has resulted in
incentives that encourage biopharma companies to make pricing decisions that are driven by
what is possible rather than what other stakeholders consider reasonable.").
178. Perhaps the clearest example of an insurer attempting to make pricing and purchasing
decisions based on effectiveness is the British National Health Service's National Institute for
Clinical Excellence (NICE). See Michael D. Rawlins & Anthony J. Culyer, National Institute for
Clinical Excellence and its Value Judgments, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 224, 224-25 (2004).
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endpoints, such as the time between starting treatment and
disease progression, rather than measures of clinical benefit,
such as patient quality of life or longer survival.1'7 Surrogate
endpoints are used because they reduce the duration of clinical
trials, while the actual clinical benefit of a drug can take years
to measure.o8 0 But all too often the surrogate endpoints fail to
correlate with meaningful clinical benefit such as overall
survival.181 For the price of a drug to reflect the value of the drug
substantial knowledge of a drug's real benefit to patients is
required. When a drug is approved before there is evidence of
its effect on the endpoints that patients care most about-
survival and quality of life-drug prices can soar without any
gain to patients. With Congress and the President both
determined to lower drug prices,18 2 there is an opportunity to
improve the process of accelerating patient access to critically
needed drugs while also reducing the costs of those drugs. A
new form of "conditional approval," which would require
prices to be significantly discounted until there is sufficient
evidence to. grant full approval, would continue to provide
accelerated access to desperate patients while improving the
balance between drug prices and patient benefit. It is also
helpful in this era of political paralysis that most, but not all, of
this can be done by the FDA without any need for new
legislation.183
179. Surrogate Endpoints, supra note 79.
180. See id.
181. See Strength of Association, supra note 78, at 1390. Although many physicians treat
patients with atrial fibrillation with costly anti-arrhythmic drugs in a strategy to maintain sinus
rhythm because it improves some surrogate endpoints, it has not been proven to improve
survival. Id.
182. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
183. See Joseph Gulfo, The FDA Needs a Conditional Approval System, FORBES (May 5, 2016,
3:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/05/05/the-fda-needs-a-conditional-
approval-system/#1c157e1749c7 (suggesting the FDA adopt a conditional approval process
similar to that used by the EMA). The EMA process is briefly described infra in text
accompanying note 196.
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A. The New Conditional Approval
History provides a very useful precedent for the FDA to
implement the conditional approval proposed here in the form
of a regulatory pathway for accelerated access and controlled
pricing that was developed in response to an earlier era of crisis
in pharmaceutical policy-the AIDS epidemic. The AIDS
epidemic appears to be the first time that there was a significant
public outcry for accelerated access.M Before the 1980's AIDS
crisis, the focus of major patient advocacy groups, such as the
American Cancer Society and the American Heart Association,
was on raising money for research. These groups were largely
unconcerned with the FDA.185 However, when the AIDS
epidemic struck, ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power)
changed the world of patient advocacy dramatically.186 ACT UP
put unprecedented pressure on the FDA to make drugs
available to patients without waiting for the safety and efficacy
of those drugs to be demonstrated in traditional clinical trials.187
The FDA responded to the AIDS crisis and the pressure of
patient advocates with several new mechanisms to provide
early access to unapproved drugs. The FDA's 1992 parallel
track initiative, used only once for the drug Stavudine, is the
most relevant for the conditional approval proposed here.188
184. See FASTERCURES & HCM STRATEGISTS, BACK TO BASICS: HIV/AIDS ADVOCACY AS A
MODEL FOR CATALYZING CHANGE 1, 16 (2011), http://www.meaction.net/wp-content/uploads
/2015/05/Back2Basics_HIV_AIDSAdvocacy.pdf ("Clearly, one of the legacies of this movement
was the fundamental shift in how patients and disease organizations interact with the federal
government and Congress.").
185. Robert Bohrer, A Better Balance Between Accelerated Access and High Priced New Drugs,
HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377
/hblog20170320.059267/full/ [hereinafter A Better Balance].
186. See generally Jim Eigo et al., FDA Action Handbook, ACT UP (Sept. 12, 1988),
http://www.actupny.org/documents/FDAhandbook.html (developing an action handbook
providing information about the FDA and the AIDS crisis, and criticizing the FDA for how it
handled the AIDS crisis).
187. See Alice Park, The Story Behind the First AIDS Drug, TIME (Mar. 19, 2017), http://
time.com/4705809/first-aids-drug-azt/.
188. Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a Parallel Track
Mechanism for People with AIDS and Other HIV-Related Disease, 57 Fed. Reg. 13250-01 (Apr.
15, 1992) [hereinafter Expanded Availability].
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Under the 1992 parallel track mechanism, physicians treating
AIDS patients could provide their patients with Stavudine,
which had not yet been approved.189 The drug sponsor was
allowed to charge for the drug, but only a price sufficient to
recover the costs of the trial.19 To justify the proposed charge,
the sponsor was required to provide sufficient financial
information to the FDA. 191 The parallel track also required the
physicians who treated patients with the drug to monitor the
patients' responses to treatment and to provide that data to the
drug sponsor.192
Adapting and building on the 1992 HIV-only parallel track
initiative could enable a more balanced approach to both the
need for accelerated access and for lower prices. The new
conditional approval would be based on surrogate endpoints.
This would allow wide distribution to desperate patients before
final approval was permitted by the parallel track initiative.
Conditional approval would also limit the price of the
conditionally approved drugs until sufficient data is collected
to warrant full approval.
The principal regulations for conditional approval already
exist within the expanded access regulations of the FDA.193
Under the conditional approval proposed here, a
pharmaceutical company with promising data from the early
stages of clinical trials for a drug to treat a life-threatening
189. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., First AIDS Drug Tested Under Parallel Track
Policy; Other d4T Related Press Releases (Oct. 5, 1992) (on file with AIDS Info), https://
aidsinfo.nih.gov/news/93/first-aids-drug-tested-under-parallel-track-policy-other-d4t-related
-press-releases.
190. Expanded Availability, supra note 188.
191. Id. PHS recognized that there could be "significant costs" to manufacturers when
"sponsoring or participating in parallel track studies," but unfortunately PHS has no control
over manufacturers' costs. Id. Sponsors may request approval from the FDA for additional
funding if it is necessary to continue the study. 21 C.F.R. § 312.8 (2018).
192. Expanded Availability, supra note 188.
193. 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.305, 312.320 (2018). The expanded access provisions of § 312.320
specifically provide a for "widespread treatment use" of a drug where "all clinical trials have
been completed" and, in the case of drugs for an "immediately life-threatening disease or
condition, the available scientific evidence, taken as a whole, provides a reasonable basis to
conclude that the investigational drug may be effective ... and would not expose patients to an
unreasonable ... risk of illness or injury."
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disease for which no satisfactory alternative therapy exists
would file for an expanded access "conditional approval" to
allow any physician treating a patient with the targeted
indication to prescribe the drug. A "conditional approval,"
when substituted for accelerated approval, would clearly meet
the requirements of 21 C.F.R § 312.310, which allows
"widespread treatment use."194 Prescribing physicians would
be required to provide the pharmaceutical company with basic
data on their patients' responses to the drug over time. The
longer-term single arm trials that would be based on
conditional approval are likely to provide adequate evidence of
safety and efficacy when the patients are being treated for an
otherwise untreatable serious disease.95
The price for a drug being provided under conditional
approval would be based on a set price formula until the
sponsor provides sufficient data for the FDA to fully approve
the drug. This would eliminate the need for pharmaceutical
companies to disclose their costs and negotiate prices and
would only require the FDA itself to publish and adopt a
change to its current regulations restricting charging for
investigational new drugs.196 This differs from other accelerated
access programs such as the European Medicines Evaluation
Agency "conditional approval," which does not limit prices and
is reviewed annually.197
B. Pricing Conditionally Approved Drugs
There are two ways that an FDA regulation establishing
conditional approval could determine the price of a drug
during the conditional approval period. The first possible
194. Id.
195. See Deborah Armstrong, MD, Johns Hopkins Kimmel Cancer Ctr., Engelberg Center for
Health Care Reform 2014 Conference on Clinical Cancer Research: The Role of Non-
Randomized Trials for the Evaluation of Oncology Drugs (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.focr.org
/sites/default/files/Non-Randomized%20Trials%20slides.pdf) (explaining application of single
arm trials for oncology drugs, including their benefits and lmitations).
196. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.8 (2018).
197. Commission Regulation 507/2006 of 29 March 2006, 2006 O.J. (L 92) 6.
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mechanism for determining the prices of conditionally
approved drugs would be based on the pharmaceutical
company's intended initial market price for the new drug. This
"initial market price" would be what the pharmaceutical
company's internal business plan projects as the "list" price for
the drug when it receives FDA approval. This method assumes
that pharmaceutical companies would set the intended market
price in the same way that pharmaceutical companies set prices
for any of their drugs following FDA approval. The price
during conditional approval could not exceed twenty-five
percent of the specified initial market price. Alternatively, the
FDA rule establishing a conditional approval pathway could set
the conditional approval price formula as a predetermined
percentage (e.g., twenty-five percent of the average price of
breakthrough drugs approved for similar conditions during the
prior two years). Under either mechanism, there would be no
need for case-by-case negotiations between the pharmaceutical
companies and the FDA.
The twenty-five percent pricing formula should cover the
costs of manufacture (which are a small fraction of the price of
drugs), distribution, a limited marketing outreach, and the
process of data collection. Marketing expenses should be very
low due to the demand by patients for a potentially life-saving
drug for which there is no alternative.
This conditional approval update of parallel track would
provide a better balance between access to potential
breakthrough drugs and substantial evidence of real clinical
benefit. By limiting profits on the conditionally approved
drugs, pharmaceutical companies would be motivated to
distribute the drug widely enough to provide the needed
evidence quickly. Limiting profits would also avoid burdening
consumers and insurers with skyrocketing prices for what are
actually unproven, still-experimental drugs such as Eteplirsen.
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CONCLUSION
Members of both parties in Congress are proposing a number
of different solutions to the high cost of new drugs.198 This
provides an opportunity to take a new approach to accelerating
access and limiting drug prices. Of course, even with a cap on
the prices of conditionally approved drugs, insurers and
government payers should be required to cover the drugs
during the conditional approval period just as they now cover
drugs approved under the accelerated access and breakthrough
drug procedure. Payers would, of course, benefit from the cap
on prices during the period of conditional approval and thus
would have little reason to oppose the conditional approval
regulations. The FDA already has the authority to establish the
conditional approval pathway and conditional approval price,
but it has no authority over insurance coverage or
reimbursement. Thus, legislation requiring insurer and payer
coverage is the only new legislative action required to
implement conditional approval. If the data collected during
conditional approval confirms the benefit of the treatment, full
approval would be granted. As is the case with all newly-
approved drugs, the drug sponsor could charge whatever price
is justified by the marketplace. However, the conditional
approval process would provide the marketplace with much
better evidence as to the drug's real worth.'1 The conditional
approval proposed here gives patients desperate for treatment
access to drugs, reduces the prices that insurers pay under the
current system, and generates the data that patients, providers,
and insurers need to evaluate a drug's actual efficacy. It is time
for a new approach to accelerating access. With pharmaceutical
prices straining the health care system and pharmaceutical
198. Katie Thomas & Reed Abelson, Lower Drug Prices: New Proposals Carry Lots of Promises,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/health/trump-drug-prices-
medicare.html; A Better Balance, supra note 185.
199. See Brenda Sandburg, Making Real World Evidence Less "Messy" To Help with Drug
Pricing, PINK SHEET (Sept. 17, 2018), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS123878
/Making-Real-World-Evidence-Less-Messy-To-Help-With-Drug-Pricing.
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companies under attack,200 conditional approval would be a
good for patients and good for us all.
200. See Carolyn Y. Johnson, Pharma, Under Attack for Drug Prices, Started an Industry War,
WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/pharma-
under-attack-for-drug-prices-started-an-industry-war/2017/12/29/800a3de8-e5bc-11e7-a65d-
lacOfd7f097e-story.html.
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